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Abstract
We present a simple model of how a monopolistic search engine optimally
determines the average quality of ﬁrms in its search pool. In our model, there
is a continuum of consumers, who use the search engine’s pool, and there is a
continuum of ﬁrms, whose entry to the pool is restricted by a price set by the
search engine. We show that a monopolistic search engine may have an incentive
to set a relatively low price that encouarges low-relevance advertisers to enter
the search pool. This conclusion is independent of whether the search engine
charges a price per click or a ﬁxed access fee.
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1 Introduction
A search engine is a platform that serves a two-sided market. It is based on a tech-
nology that potentially improves the quality of consumer search. Before the advent of
internet search engines, yellow pages were the closest example of a search engine. Firms
pay in order to be included in the yellow pages, with various degrees of prominence.
The yellow pages organize the set of ﬁrms according to some categorization system. In
internet environments, consumers use search engines by submitting a query in a lan-
guage dictated by the search engine. The objects that the query elicits depend on the
search engine’s method. In particular, a “sponsored links” system assigns objects to
queries according to a mechanism in which ﬁrms pay the search engine for (prominent)
appearance on the list of query results.
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1In the current age of Google, there is a near-monopoly in the industry of internet
search engines. Our objective in this short paper is to present a simple, tractable model
of sponsored-link pricing by a monopolistic search engine. Our model builds on a model
of sequential consumer search due to Wolinsky (1986). We enrich Wolinsky’s model
by allowing for heterogeneity in the ﬁrms’ degree of “relevance” for consumers, and by
introducing a search engine that controls the search pool via its pricing decision.
Our main result is that the search engine may ﬁnd it optimal to degrade the quality
of the search pool by setting a low price-per-click that encourages low-relevance ﬁrms
to enter. This leads to higher search costs and higher prices in the search pool. While
it may come as no surprise that monopoly can generate an ineﬃcient outcome, the dis-
torting eﬀects of monopoly in the case of search engine pricing are novel and therefore,
worthy of separate enquiry. Here, a better pool of ﬁrms has a negative eﬀect on the
monopolist’s proﬁts because it leads to more competition among the ﬁrms, which, in
turn, leads to lower prices and shorter searches (i.e., fewer “clicks”).
Because we assume a large population of ﬁrms, our model allows us to abstract
from auction-theoretic aspects and considerations of prominence (see our discussion
in Section 5), in order to focus in the simplest manner possible on implications of
search engine pricing for consumer search costs and product prices. As such, our paper
complements existing theoretical work on search engines.
The closest paper to ours is Chen and He (2006), which develops a model of price
competition with sequential consumer search, in which a ﬁnite number ﬁrms with
diﬀerent degrees of relevance bid for prominence. They show that the search engine
may sometimes be better oﬀ with a lower quality pool in the sense that its revenue
from the position auction has an inverted U-shape with respect to the highest level
of relevance. However, unlike our model, the search engine in their framework cannot
control the average quality (relevance) in its search pool. In addition, we assume a
large population of ﬁrms, which enables us to get more mileage in the analysis of the
search engine’s problem.
Ellison and Athey (2008) combine a model of sequential consumer search with a
position auction design by the search engine, without incorporating price setting by
ﬁrms in the search pool. Armstrong, Vickers and Zhou (2009) analyze price competition
with sequential consumer search, where one ﬁrm appears ﬁrst in the consumers’ search
list. Finally, the main result in this paper is also reminiscent of Hagiu and Jullien
(2009), who make a similar point - namely, that platforms in two-sided markets may
have an incentive to put obstacles on consumer search - in the context of a very diﬀerent
two-sided-market model.
22A M o d e l
Let us begin with a market search model without a search engine, which extends a
model due to Wolinsky (1986) by introducing heterogeneity among ﬁrms in a way that
broadly follows Chen and He (2006). The market consists of a continuum of consumers
and a continuum of ﬁrms. A ﬁrm’s type is a number q, which is distributed over [0,1].
When a consumer is matched with a ﬁrm of type q, the match has positive value for the
consumer with probability q. Conditional on a positive-value match, the consumer’s
willingness to pay for the ﬁrm’s product is randomly drawn (independently across all
matches) from U[0,1].T h e ﬁrms’ cost of providing their products is normalized to
zero.
We interpret q as a measure of the ﬁrm’s “relevance” for the consumers. For
example, think of ﬁrms as websites providing holiday packages. A ﬁrm with a higher
q corresponds to a website with a wider range of destinations and hotel types, such
that the consumer’s need is more likely to be met. Note that all the heterogeneity
among ﬁrms is summarized by the probability of a positive-value match, but there is
no heterogeneity conditional on this event. This modelling strategy greatly simpliﬁes
the analysis.
The market interaction proceeds as follows. Each ﬁrm simultaneously chooses a
price for its product. Consumers form a belief of the distribution of prices in the
market, and follow a conventional sequential-search process with a search cost of s per
round. When a consumer samples a ﬁrm, he learns the value of the match and the
ﬁrm’s price, and optimally decides whether or not to continue searching (i.e., drawing
a new sample from the population of ﬁrms). A stopping rule is a function that speciﬁes
the realized match values and prices for which the consumer stops searching.
For analytical convenience, we focus on market outcomes in which all ﬁrms charge
t h es a m ep r i c e .Auniform-price market equilibrium is a price p∗ and a stopping rule
for consumers, which satisfy the following properties: (i) given that all ﬁrms charge p∗,
the consumers’ stopping rule is optimal; (ii) given the consumers’ stopping rule and
the belief that all ﬁrms charge p∗,n oﬁrm has an incentive to deviate to a diﬀerent
price.
Let us now introduce a monopolistic search engine into the model. Before the above
market interaction takes place, the search engine limits ﬁrms’ entry into the search pool.
Speciﬁcally, the search engine posts a “price-per-click” r. This is a payment from the
ﬁrm to the search engine each time a consumer visits the ﬁr m .N o t et h a tt h ep a y m e n t
is independent of whether the ﬁrm eventually transacts with the consumer. Only ﬁrms
3that accept the posted price-per-click are admitted into the search pool. In the ensuing
market equilibrium, consumers base their behavior on a correct expectation of the set
of ﬁrms that entered the search pool. The search engine chooses r to maximize its
revenue, which is r multiplied by the expected number of “clicks” - i.e., the expected
number of samples that consumers draw in the market equilibrium induced by r.
Our assumption that ﬁrms are charged per click is motivated by the observation
that this is how real-life search engines operate. We will depart from this assumption
later in this paper. Following the same motivation, we assume that consumers are not
charged for accessing the search engine’s pool of ﬁrms. However, this assumption is
also partly justiﬁed if there exists a “universal” pool where all ﬁrms belong (including
those that are left outside the search engine’s pool), where consumers can search for
free. This pool can be interpreted as oﬄine search. Since ﬁrms in the search engine’s
pool are on average more relevant than ﬁrms in the universal pool, consumers will tend
to prefer searching in the former. However, if the search engine employs an access fee
to extract consumers’ surplus with access fee, this may impel them to switch to the
universal pool.
3A n a l y s i s
Our analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we take the set of ﬁr m st h a te n t e rt h es e a r c h
pool as given and characterize uniform-price equilibrium. Second, we incorporate this
characterization into the search engine’s problem and determine the optimal price-per-
click.
3.1 Equilibrium Characterization for a Given Search Pool
Let us begin with a characterization of uniform-price market equilibria, taking the
set of ﬁrms that entered the search pool as given. As in many other sequential-search
models, our market model has a trivial equilibrium in which all ﬁrms post a price equal
to the highest willingness to pay, p =1 , and consumers choose not to search at all.
This is the equilibrium characterized by Diamond (1971) and known since then as the
“Diamond Paradox”. However, if search costs are suﬃciently low (see below), there is
also a uniform-price market equilibrium with active search, and we will focus on this
equilibrium.
4Proposition 1 In a uniform-price market equilibrium with active search, consumers
stop if and only if the value of a match with the current ﬁrm is at least
v
∗ =1−
s
2s
E(q)
(1)
where E(q) is the expectation with respect to the population of ﬁrms in the search pool.
Firms charge the uniform price
p
∗ =1− v
∗ =
s
2s
E(q)
(2)
Proof. Our proof is a minor extension of a derivation by Wolinsky (1986). Let us
begin with the consumers’ stopping rule. Because all ﬁrms charge p∗,c o n s u m e r sf a c e
a stationary environment. Therefore, their stopping decision obeys a cutoﬀ rule. That
is, there exists v∗ ∈ [0,1],g i v e nb y
E(q) ·
Z 1
v∗
(v − v
∗)dv = s
such that in equilibrium, consumers stop if and only if the current match value is
v ≥ v∗. The L.H.S represents the incremental expected beneﬁt from one more search,
while the R.H.S represents the cost of one more search. The proof is standard and
therefore omitted. Solving this equation yields the expression for v∗.
Now consider the pricing decision of a ﬁrm of type q.I ft h eﬁrm deviates from the
equilibrium price p∗ to another price p, a consumer who samples the ﬁrm and learns
that the match value is v>0 will buy the ﬁrm’s product if
v − p>v
∗ − p
∗
because the R.H.S of this inequality represents the consumer’s reservation surplus con-
ditional on a positive-value match. Thus, the probability that the consumer will buy
at p is 1 − p − v∗ + p∗, by the assumption that v is drawn from U[0,1] (ignoring the
possibility of corner solutions, which is easy to dismiss). Therefore, the ﬁrm will choose
p to maximize
p · (1 − p − v
∗ + p
∗)
5In equilibrium, the solution to this maximization problem coincides with p∗, yielding
p
∗ =1− v
∗
To see how our model relates to Wolinsky (1986), think of the consumer’s “eﬀective
search cost” of a consumer as the total expected cost that a consumer incurs before
reaching a positive-value (i.e., relevant) match. This is precisely s/E(q). The model
due to Wolinsky (1986) is a special case in which q =1 , hence the eﬀective search cost
coincides with s.
The gross proﬁt-per-click that a ﬁrm of type q0 earns in active-search equilibrium
(i.e., excluding the transfer to the search engine) is
q
0 · p
∗ · (1 − v
∗)=q
0 ·
2s
E(q)
The conversion rate - namely, the expected stopping probability - is
E[q · (1 − v
∗)] = E[q ·
s
2s
E(q)
]=
p
2s · E(q)
Note that the inverse of this probability is the expected duration of search.
Turning to consumer welfare, note that consumers ﬁnd it optimal to enter the
market and face the uniform-price equilibrium only if their ex-ante expected surplus
from searching in the pool is non-negative. The ex-ante expected surplus is equal to
the expected value of the item that will ultimately be purchased, minus its equilibrium
price minus the expected search costs. This amount is given by
E(v | v ≥ v
∗) − p
∗ −
s
p
2s · E(q)
= v
∗ − p
∗
By Proposition 1, this reduces to
1 −
s
8s
E(q)
(3)
This means that the uniform-price equilibrium with active search exists if and only if
E(q) > 8s.
63.2 The Optimal Price-Per-Click
In this sub-section, we assume that the uniform-price equilibrium with active search
is played (whenever it exists) in the search pool induced by any given price-per-click.
Let us characterize this search pool. Given that the search engine’s price-per-click is
r,aﬁrm of type q0 chooses to enter a pool if and only if
q
0 ·
2s
E(q)
≥ r
The expectation in E(q) is taken with respect to the set of ﬁrms that choose to
enter the search pool. If a ﬁrm of type q
0 prefers to enter, then any type q00 >q 0 strictly
prefer to enter. It follows that given r, the set of ﬁrm types that choose to enter is
[q∗,1],w h e r eq∗ is deﬁned as follows:
q
∗ ·
2s
Eq≥q∗(q)
= r (4)
This equation may have multiple solutions. We will assume that in this case, the search
engine is free to select its most desirable solution.
Recall that the search engine’s expected revenue is the price-per-click r multiplied
by the expected number of clicks in the induced equilibrium, which is the inverse of
the conversion rate. This leads to our ﬁrst main result.
Proposition 2 The search engine’s problem can be reformulated as follows: choose
the critical type q∗ ∈ [0,1) to maximize
q∗
[Eq≥q∗(q)]
3
2
(5)
subject to the constraint that a uniform-price market equilibrium with active search
exists in the search pool induced by q∗ - i.e.
Eq≥q∗(q) ≥ 8s
This maximization problem involves a subtle trade-oﬀ. When the search engine sets
r in a way that eﬀectively increases q∗, this has several implications. First, the change
in the proﬁt-per-click is ambiguous. On one hand, the equilibrium product price goes
7down because a higher-quality search pool creates a more competitive environment.
On the other hand, the conversion rate goes up. Both are equilibrium implications of
the increase in the quality of the search pool, and they have opposite eﬀects on the
ﬁrms’ proﬁt-per-click. Second, the increase in q∗ lowers the expected number of clicks
(because it is the inverse of the conversion rate). This lowers the search engine’s total
proﬁt.
Note that the domain in the search engine’s maximization problem is [0,1).T h e
reason q∗ =1is not feasible is technical - we want to ensure that for any q∗ that the
ﬁrm may set, there is a strictly positive measure of ﬁrms that enter the search pool.
When the maximization problem has no solution because of this open-set feature, the
ﬁrm wants to set the cutoﬀ q∗ arbitrarily close to 1. Our interpretation is that it is
optimal for the search engine to admit only the highest quality ﬁrms.
However, the search engine may ﬁnd it optimal to set r such that q∗ < 1,w h i c h
is tantamount to contaminating the search pool with ﬁrms of relatively low relevance.
The following simple example illustrates this motive.
Example 1 Suppose that q is distributed as follows: with probability α, q =1 ,a n d
with probability 1 − α, q = L<1.I ft h eﬁrm sets r such that q∗ =1 , its normalized
total proﬁti s1. If the search engine sets r such that q∗ = L, its normalized total proﬁt
is
L
[α +( 1− α)L]
3
2
The search engine will strictly prefer to induce q∗ = L by setting
r =
2sL
α +( 1− α)L
whenever
α<
L
2
3(1 − L
1
3)
1 − L
For example, when L = 1
2, the search engine will degrade the quality of the search pool
whenever α / 1
4.
It is interesting to note that even if the search engine charged consumers for ac-
cessing its pool, it may still ﬁnd it optimal to degrade the quality of this pool. To see
this, suppose that the search engine could charge consumers an access fee that extracts
their entire ex-ante surplus from using its search pool. Then by (3) and (5), the search
8engine’s problem would consist of choosing q∗ to maximize the sum,
1+
q∗
[Eq≥q∗(q)]
3
2
−
s
8s
Eq≥q∗(q)
This means that the search engine’s incentive to set a low q∗ is somewhat curbed by
t h en e g a t i v ee ﬀect this has on consumer’s surplus. However, the search engine may
still ﬁnd it optimal to set q∗ < 1. For instance, if in Example 1,s= 1
64,α=0 .18 and
L =0 .6, setting q∗ = L maximizes the search engine’s proﬁt.
3.3 Equivalence between Access Fee and Price-Per-Click
An alternative way to restrict ﬁrms’ entry into the search engine’s pool is to charge
ﬁrms a lump-sum access fee a. This method is characteristic of yellow pages, because
unlike internet-age search engines, yellow pages are unable to monitor the consumers’
search activities. As with price-per-clicks, if a ﬁrm of type q decided to pay a, so would
every q0 >q .As in the previous subsection, let q∗ denote the marginal ﬁrm type, which
is indiﬀerent between paying a and staying out of the pool. The access fee a would
then be equal to the expected proﬁto fﬁrm q∗. To compute this proﬁt, let ρ denote the
ratio of consumers to the ﬁrms in the general population. The expected total number
of clicks that each ﬁrm receives is
1
1 − {1 − Eq≥q∗[q · (1 − v∗)]}
·
ρ
1 − F(q∗)
The marginal ﬁrm’s proﬁt-per-click is, as before, q∗ · (1 − v∗) · p∗,w h e r ep∗ is the
equilibrium price in the search pool. Therefore:
a =
ρ
1 − F(q∗)
·
q∗
Eq≥q∗(q)
· p
∗
By (2), the search engine’s decision problem is to choose q∗ ∈ [0,1) that maximizes the
expression,
ρ
√
2s
1 − F(q∗)
·
q∗
[Eq≥q∗(q)]
3
2
· [1 − F(q
∗)]
This leads to our second main result.
Proposition 3 The search pool that maximizes the search engine’s proﬁti si n d e p e n -
dent of whether it charges a ﬁxed access fee or a price-per-click.
9Thus, our conclusion that the search engine may ﬁnd it optimal to degrade the
quality of its search pool extends to the case in which it charges a ﬁxed access fee.
4 Competition between Search Engines
We conclude this paper with a brief discussion of a competitive version of our model
of search engine pricing. Two search engines simultaneously choose a price-per-click.
Given a proﬁle (r1,r 2) of prices-per-click, each ﬁrm chooses whether to enter each of
the two search pools operated by the two search engines. Note that ﬁrms can enter
both pools. Simultaneously, consumers choose to enter at most one of the two search
pools. After ﬁrms and consumers make their entry decisions, they proceed to play an
active-search equilibrium (if one exists) in the search pool.
Coordination failures introduce uninteresting equilibria where all consumers enter
only one pool. We, therefore, consider the following equilibrium reﬁnement: given
(r1,r 2), each ﬁrm enters any pool which would be proﬁtable if a positive measure of
consumers entered that pool. This is a reasonable reﬁnement, since a ﬁrm is indiﬀerent
between entering and staying out of a search pool when no consumers enter it. The
reﬁnement may be viewed as capturing ﬁrms’ response to some form of “trembles” on
the part of consumers: with small probability a consumer enters a pool even if the
other pool leads to strictly higher proﬁts.
Thus, a ﬁrm of type q will enter the pool operated by search engine i if and only if
q ≥ q∗
i,w h e r eq∗
i solves equation (4) (we ignore the possibility of multiple solutions).
Suppose that q∗
1 >q ∗
2. Then, consumers necessarily choose to enter the search pool
operated by search engine 1. The reason is that this search pool is characterized
by a lower equilibrium price and a higher stopping probability than the search pool
operated by search engine 2. It follows that in market equilibrium, both ﬁrms will set
r1 = r2 =2 s,s u c ht h a tq∗
1 = q∗
2 =1 . That is, competitive forces maximize search
quality. As a result, they maximize the price-per-click that search engines post and
the conversion rate, and they minimize the product price that consumers confront in
the search process. In this sense, search engine pricing responds to competition in a
way that beneﬁts consumers.
5 Concluding Remarks
Throughout our analysis, we assumed that the search engine has only one means for
controlling the quality of the search pool - namely, manipulating the price that it
10charges from ﬁrms. Suppose that the search engine could also directly manipulate the
search cost s (e.g., by slowing down its server, or by deliberately throwing irrelevant
links into query results). Then, it is straightforward to see that the search engine
would set a price-per-click r∗ = 1
4, coupled with a search cost s∗ = 1
8. This induces
an outcome in which only ﬁrms of type q =1enter the search pool, while consumers
earn a zero surplus. In reality, reputational concerns may prevent search engines from
deliberately degrading their search pool in this direct manner.
Our analysis has also abstracted from issues of prominence (which are typically
addresses by a search engine through the use of position auction). One justiﬁcation for
this is our assumption that there is a large supply of ﬁrms (approximated by inﬁnity).
To see why, consider the case of two ﬁrm types, q =1and q = L<1, that bid in a
position auction. In reality, search engines do not position the query results in exact
accordance with the ordering of the bids, but “blur” it to some extent. Furthermore,
the precise blurring algorithm is kept secret, so that the ﬁrms do not know exactly how
their bidding behavior maps into position.
S u p p o s et h a tt h es e a r c he n g i n ed o e sn o tb l u rt h eo r d e r i n go fb i d sa ta l l .T h e n ,i n
the auction process, ﬁrms with q =1will outbid ﬁrms with q = L, and as a result, the
search pool will eﬀectively consist of q =1types only. In equilibrium, these ﬁrms will
pay the amount that gives them zero proﬁts, which is given by our model for q∗ =1 .
Now suppose that the search engine completely blurs the ordering of bids. Then, ﬁrms
have no reason to bid for prominence. Therefore, in equilibrium ﬁrms will never bid
above the reserve price-per-click set by the search engine. The optimal reserve price
i sg i v e nb yo u rm o d e l .A n da sw es a w ,i tm a yb eo p t i m a lf o rt h es e a r c he n g i n et os e t
the reserve price such that all ﬁrms will choose to enter. What our analysis in this
paper does not capture is partial blurring of the ordering of bids in a position auction.
However, our model at least shows that in a position auction with a large number of
ﬁrms, the search engine may prefer total blurring to no blurring at all.
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